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Abstract 
The objectives of this research are twofold, to test the audit quality of companies that change 
their auditors either voluntarily or mandatorily and to test the financial characteristics as a factor 
for an accounting firm to engage in pseudo mandatory rotation. Since 2002, Indonesia has had 
legislation mandating companies to rotate their auditor after six years of consecutive 
engagements (five years prior to 2008). However, auditors sometimes seem to find their own 
way to deceive the mandatory regulation by a tactic called “pseudo” mandatory rotation. Thus, 
we divide mandatory rotation into two categories, pure and pseudo mandatory rotation.  
The results of the data we collected since the Ministerial decree became effective in 2003 
indicate companies that rotate their auditors mandatorily have higher audit quality than that of 
companies voluntarily rotating auditors. However, we cannot find evidence that pseudo and pure 
mandatory rotation have different audit qualities. The results also indicate that switching among 
bigger accounting firms have the highest audit quality rather than switching between smaller 
audit firms which have lower audit quality. Lastly, the motives of an accounting firm to engage 
in pseudo or pure mandatory rotation are related to the financial size of their clients. Future 
research must consider the limitation stated in this study.6 
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INTRODUCTION 
Indonesia is one among few countries that mandates auditor rotation7. The regulation of auditor 
rotation has been enacted since 2002 and is still in effect until today8. The enactment of this 
regulation has some implications on research and raises debate between regulators and 
academicians. The debate questions which one is better among these polar opposites, whether to 
regulate or not to. 
The investigation of the effect of mandatory auditor rotation outside Indonesia are rarely 
studied. This is caused by the fact that not many countries have such regulation. For example, a 
study in South Korea conducted by Kwon et al. (2014) indicates that the audit quality did not 
change there. Meanwhile, investigation from other perspective conducted by Cameran et al. 
(2015) shows that replaced auditor (or in its final year before rotation) does not decrease its audit 
quality. However, the audit fee is raised by 7% compared to previous years. On the contrary, this 
investigation found an indication of lowballing (as low as 17%) is raised abnormally in later 
years by the replacing auditor in the first year of its tenure. In relation to the audit quality, they 
found evidence of lower audit quality during the first three years of engagements before being 
raised into higher tenure.  
Several studies have investigated the importance of mandatory auditor rotation in 
Indonesia. Febrianto & Sugiri (2014) for example, fail to find changes in audit quality of firms 
that rotated their auditors. Another research with similar conclusion was drawn by Siregar et al. 
(2011), earlier than the research above. Both studies were tested from 2002-2008 or during first 
rotation in which the latter rotation may be untouched. 
Febrianto & Sugiri (2014) invited other researchers to investigate audit quality of more 
rotating firms further. They believe that some of the auditees are still audited by the same 
accounting firm before and after the mandatory rotation. This indication can be seen from 
foreign affiliation that local accounting firm has. If pre-rotation and post-rotation were audited 
by the same auditor, the increase in audit quality being aimed will be an empirical question to 
answer then. Febrianto & Sugiri (2014), Siregar et al. (2011), as well as Junaidi et al. (2014) call 
this type of auditor rotation as pseudo mandatory rotation.  
Research Importance 
This research is important based on several reasons. First, the regulation of mandatory auditor 
rotation is unique and can only be found in few countries outside Indonesia. The US government 
has launched several tactics to have supports regulating accounting firm rotation but 
academicians come out with evidence contrary to government’s expectation. Therefore, people 
are still interested to answer whether this requirement may have some effect on audit quality or 
not. Second, some Indonesian local accounting firms have agreed to change their local identity 
but still maintain their foreign affiliation. This motivation may be related to maintaining one or 
more important clients which have deep pockets. Siregar et al. (2011), Febrianto & Sugiri 
(2014), and Junaidi et al. (2014) all find some indications of this motivation. Therefore, the 
                                                                
7 Other countries that also mandate auditor rotation are Italia and South Korea. Italia has enacted the regulation since 
1975 (Cameran et al., 2015). European Union has also considered it even though it is still not enacted. South Korea 
mandates auditor rotation during 2006-2010 (Kwon et al. 2014). Other countries that mandate auditor rotation are 
Brazil and Singapore—only for banks (Kwon et al., 2014).  
8 Current regulation is Ministry Regulation Decree No. 17/2008. This decree replaces decree No. 423/2002. Later 
the Presidential decree No. 20/2015 also regulates auditor rotation. However, Article 11 of that decreee only 
regulates a partner tenure in a client, not the CPA firm’s tenure. So, ministrial decree No. 17/2008 is still relevant.  
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regulator must be interested in the reasons why some accounting firms desperately wanted to 
keep their clients and managed to find loopholes in the regulation.  This raised several questions 
such as what motivates the accounting firm to do so, who the client is, and what power it has on 
the auditor. No study so far has addressed this question yet. 
Research Contribution  
The results of this study will provide additional evidence for Indonesian government, as well 
other countries’, with the advantages of mandatory auditor rotation regulation. Some studies 
have been conducted set in Indonesia to study the impact of this regulation on audit quality. The 
results are still inclonclusive and bring some debates since some accounting firms find the 
loopholes so that they can retain their clients longer than the regulation have allowed.  
 The results of this study will also be beneficial to academic communities as a whole since 
studies on the impact of this regulation can only be done in a country that has regulated 
mandatory auditor rotation. While the US government is eager to regulate firm-level rotation, 
public in the US have divided opinion related to such regulation. Therefore, the results will be 
beneficial to much larger communities in the world. Lastly, the conclusion on the characteristics 
of companies that are retained by their auditors can also be beneficial to the regulator by 
exploiting the loopholes in the regulation. They can assess the impact of the loopholes later on 
the idea of maintaining higher audit quality. Empirical evidence found in this research can also 
be used as a base to be considered in future regulation. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
Voluntary vs. Mandatory Auditor Rotation 
The idea of whether to apply mandatory rotation to accounting firm is more necessary or to let 
the client and auditor decide their tenure are still debated in the US. Regulator thinks that the 
tenure in audit industry must be regulated, while some academicians oppose the idea. The basic 
issue here is how to maintain the auditor’s independence. The regulator and some academicians 
believe the auditor’s independence is declined if the tenure is not limited. The logic flows that 
the longer the tenure and the more income the auditor depends on the client, the more declining 
its independence.   
Some practioners and academicians disagree with the idea on the negative relationship 
between auditor’s independence with auditor tenure. DeFond & Francis (2005:9) stated that the 
incidence of audit failures are almost zero. Similar to them, the auditing professions opined  that 
every time the auditor is engaged with a new client, there are two costs that must be considered: 
(1) cost that relates to study and comprehend client’s business and (2) litigation cost. Both costs 
are interrelated which the auditor is responsible for such unlawful action of their client since the 
financial report is joint product of both auditor and the client (Kinney, 1999).  
The criticism that public poses againts the idea of mandatory rotation is related to the logic 
behind the imposition to switch the auditor. They believe that the business is better off if the 
government let the auditor and its client to decide their own tenure, and the government does not 
have to step in. They also believe that a longer tenure is related to more understanding on client’s 
business, lower probabilities of client to commit in fraudulent action, lower audit risk, and more 
benefits (see DeFond & Francis, 2005 for detail discussion).   
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Bockus & Gigler (1998) argue that auditor will likely to withdraw if the risk they face in 
auditing a client is increased. The risk may be a result of both party disagreed on a certain 
accounting estimate. Antle & Nalebuff (1991) and Dye (1991) propose that auditor’s proposition 
will be accepted by the client if auditor’s estimates are close to that of client’s. If they never met 
an agreement on that such estimates, we can predict that client will fire the auditor or, else, the 
auditor will resign (Dye, 1991). 
However, the scenario above is only true if both auditor and client are free to decide their 
own engagement. In a regime where a law decides an auditor must be replaced, the auditor 
switching is not due to the disagreement between both party but it is caused by the regulation 
that decide their separation and the client finds a new auditor. The new auditor may have a little 
information on this client’s reputation and business. Therefore, it is expected that the new auditor 
will put more skepticism on this engagement.  
A higher level of skepticism has two opposite sides. First, it will raise audit fee since 
auditor has to bear a higher audit start-up cost. If an auditor is replaced with a new one, the new 
auditor has no guarantee for next year’s service since the regulation itself permits the client to 
come back to the previous one. Since the probability to retain the client is slim, then the audit fee 
imposed on the new client may be higher than on the normal first time engagement. The 
lowballing phenomenon addressed by DeAngelo (1981) may not be surfaced since the new 
auditor does not expect the client will retain them as long as the regulation permits.  
The other side of a higher level of skepticism is related to auditor’s prudence in auditing 
new client. If the auditor does not know its client’s business or its reputation in the past, the 
auditor will be more careful to audit this new client. The more prudence the auditor, the lower 
the litigation cost. Nagy (2005) shows that auditors of ex-Andersen’s clients become more 
conservative in choosing accounting methods that decrease the income. This action is triggered 
by perception that ex-Andersen’s clients bear more risks (Cahan & Zhang, 2006). The 
proponents of mandatory auditor rotation argue that the regulation will bring higher audit quality 
because regularly the auditor will face new client.  
Auditor Rotation Regulation in Indonesia 
Indonesia is among few countries that mandates both partner and accounting firm rotation. This 
regulation was first enacted in 2002 through the Ministry of Finance decree No. 423. Article 6 
verses 4 of the decree stated that an accounting firm may only provide a general audit up to to 
five consecutive years, while a partner may only lead an audit for three consecutive years in a 
single client. Later in Article 59 verses 5 and 6 stated that the accounting firm or the partner may 
still provide the service for one more year if they have signed a contract with their clients for 
another year. This 2002 decree was then amended in 2003 and finally in 2008. In the last decree, 
the accounting firm can audit a client up to six consecutive years and after one cooling off year 
the auditor can re-engage with the same client.  
This decree has several implications to the research in auditing. First, this creates some 
space for research in mandatory auditor rotation, either partner or accounting firm, which most 
other country cannot test. Second, until the year 2016, mandatory rotations have been conducted 
by companies in Indonesia at least two times. Therefore, if Siregar et al. (2011), Febrianto & 
Sugiri (2014), and Junaidi et al. (2014) can only observe single rotation, by the year 2014/2015 
more data are already available.  
 Third, MOF decree No. 17/2008 opens an opportunity for a client to re-engage with 
former auditor after one year being “parked” by another auditor. The other tactic that may be 
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exploited is what so called pseudo auditor rotation (Siregar et al., 2011; Febrianto & Sugiri, 
2014; and Junaidi et al., 2014). There are two loopholes to exploit from the Article 3 verses 5 
and 6 of MOF decree. One, if an accounting firm change the composition of their CPAs and only 
keep less than 50% of them, then the new accounting firm is different from the former; or, two, if 
the company changes its name and only maintains less than 50% of the former CPAs in the new 
firm, then the new accounting is recognized as different from the former.9 Luckily, the regulation 
is silenced on the foreign affiliation, so even though a client is said to change its local auditor, 
the foreign affiliation retains the same, and even situated at the same office address. 
 The question that may quickly follow is whether this behavior will decrease the quality of 
audit or not. Nagy (2005) is one of many that disagrees with the idea of mandatory rotation. He 
provided evidence of a higher skepticism exercised by auditors of ex-Andersen clients. He takes 
it as an example of a mandatory rotation—while in fact it is not. Later Knechel & Vanstraelen 
(2007) provided evidence that may contradict to Nagy’s (2005). They show that low audit 
quality in a shorter term tenure is more likely to be caused by either lack competence or lack of 
independency. Moreover, the low audit quality in a longer tenure period may due to the loss of 
independency. Their results reject a claim made by Carcello & Nagy (2004) that audit failures 
observed in the first years of engagements are caused by problems on the client’s side. Their 
results showing the fact that happened are on the opposite.  
Some studies are not supportive to the idea that audit quality will be increased after the 
rotation. Johnson et al. (2002) found evidence that auditors with short tenure (2-3 years) show a 
higher level of unexpected accrual as compared to auditors with medium tenure (4-8 years). 
Moreover, samples that have longer tenure (>9 years) do not show a statistically significant 
difference to samples with medium tenure. Myers et al. (2003) concluded that longer auditor 
tenure is correlated with higher earnings quality. They argue that there is no evidence to support 
the claim that mandatory rotation can increase financial reporting quality. 
However, there is a study that does support the mandatory rotation idea. Dopuch et al. 
(2001) clearly have the evidence that auditors exhibit lower judgment bias when they are in a 
mandatory rotation regime than when they are in voluntary rotation regime. Considering the 
conclusions that Dopuch et al. (2001) have, studies that do not support the mandatory rotation 
idea, e.g. DeFond & Francis (2005), are failed to quote Dopuch et al.’s (2001) study. The 
importance of  their study is significant and their study should be published on post-Enron 
debacle and post-SOX. Like Dopuch et al. (2001), Carey & Simnett (2006) conclude that there is 
a decline in audit quality which has longer audit partner’s tenure.  
To summarize, hipothetically, auditors will show different behavior if they are in different 
circumstances, in this case, whether they are in a mandatory or voluntary rotation regime. This is 
logical since the essence of a rotation is to limit, if not to cut, the dependency of the auditors to 
their client. The absence of rotation regulation will be functioned as an incentive to auditors to 
retain their clients as long as possible. The longer the tenure, the more income will flow to the 
accounting firm from a certain client and the higher the probability the auditors to be dependent 
financially from their clients. Certainly, it cannot be said that an auditor become financially 
dependent on a certain client; and perhaps it never be. However, it is theoretically logical that 
mandatory rotation can cut the likelihood of an auditor to be dependent on its client. Therefore, 
we can expect that audit quality is higher in companies that rotate their auditors mandatorily than 
in companies that rotate their auditors voluntarily. The first hypothesis is below. 
 
                                                                
9 For our study purpose, we call this as dissolve and reform strategy. 
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H1 Audit quality of companies that rotate their auditors mandatorily is 
higher than companies that rotate voluntarily. 
Related to the loopholes found in the MOF decree, it can be concluded that the loopholes in that 
decree are exploited by the accounting firms and their clients to create a pseudo mandatory 
auditor rotation. This pseudo rotation phenomenon is clearly contradicted to the regulator’s idea 
that rotation is needed to preserve audit quality. If an auditor agrees to take advantage of the 
loopholes available in the Article 3 verses 5 and 6 of that MOF decree for the sake of retaining 
certain client(s), then it can be expected that the auditor’s independency on that client is lower 
than other client that is audited by the same auditor. Likewise, the audit quality of retained client 
is also lower than clients of other auditors that do not exploit the regulation’s loopholes. The 
second hypothesis is as follows: 
   
H2 Audit quality of companies that pseudo-mandatorily rotated their 
auditors are lower than companies that mandatorily rotated their 
auditors.  
 
The third hypothesis is based on the idea that bigger accounting firms will deliver higher audit 
quality than that of smaller ones (for example see DeAngelo, 1981). The idea may hold if a client 
switches accounting firms of different and similar size. We may expect using the argument that 
bigger accounting firms have higher quality than that of smaller one. The audit quality among 
firms switching from bigger to bigger and from smaller to smaller accounting firms will be 
equal. While on the contrary, switching among firms of different size will be unequal.   
 
H3 Audit quality of companies that switch auditors between bigger 
accounting firms is different than that of that switch from auditor of 
different size, i.e. the one that switches between bigger accounting firms 
has the highest audit quality. 
The Characteristics of Pure and Pseudo-Rotating Companies 
If the auditor only has one or several years of tenure with a client, the accumulative fees received 
from that client may not be as significant as total income of the auditor. However, as the tenure 
gets longer and more services rendered, it is not impossible for the auditor to compromise its 
independency. The bigger the client is, more probability of such behavior will occur. In fear of 
losing big pocket clients, auditor will find a way to retain them.  
The problem on the dependency is very much related to the ratio between the number of 
accounting firms and auditees. The competition is stiff among accounting firms while the market 
is relatively small and does not grow. Since the quality among accounting firms differs each 
other, clients will always find an auditor with a good quality. The quality is not always the factor 
of consideration. Clients actually will find an auditor that suits their needs. In sum, it is natural to 
expect a close relationship between auditor and its client and this relationship will last as long as 
possible. 
If the auditor has a long relationship with its client while regulation prohibits this, 
resistance will emerge. This resistance may not always be in the form of refusal of the regulation 
since the regulation may have some loopholes and auditor can exploit them. Regarding this MOF 
decree, pseudo-mandatory rotation is the manifestation of this resistance.  
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The question is, how important is a client to an auditor so that the CPA firm agrees to 
dismiss more than 50% of its CPAs and form a new firm; or dismiss the firm itself and form a 
new one while only maintain not more than 50% of old CPAs? The client company that force the 
accounting firm to take the advantage of the loopholes must be significantly different from any 
other companies. Therefore, the third hypothesis as follows: 
 
H4 Characteristics of companies that pseudo-mandatorily rotated their 
auditors are different from companies that pure mandatorily rotated 
their auditors.  
RESEARCH METHOD 
Samples 
PMK (MOF decree) No. 17/2008 is a follow-up regulation of KMK No. 423/2002. In this regard, 
the selection of the sampling companies that conducted the mandatory and voluntary rotation of 
auditor is determined by the observation on auditor switch which has occurred since 2003. The 
determination of whether a rotation or changing of the auditor in 2003—or at the latest in 
200410—was a mandatory rotation or not has to be conducted through the observation of auditors 
within the last five years before the rotation year. The replacement of auditor occurred in 2003 
(or 2004) is called as a mandatory rotation if since 2002 (or 2003) a client has been audited by 
the same auditor for five consecutive years. Otherwise, if the audit period is less than five years, 
it can be called a voluntary rotation. The same procedure would be applied to the observation of 
the replacement of auditor occurred after the enactment of PMK 17/2008.11 The samples are 
selected from the nonfinancial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) from 
2002 to 2015. For the case of newly listed firms in IDX, they have to be, at least, already six-
year-old when the observation year is started.  
 
Definition of Opertional Variables and Hypotheses Testings 
Hypothesis 1, 2 and 3     
Following Becker et al. (1998), DeFond & Subramanyam (1998), Bartov et al. (2000) 
and Nagy (2005), this study uses discretionary accrual as a proxy for audit quality.12  The 
discretionary accrual is estimated by using the Jones’ model that was modified by DeFond & 
Jiambalvo (1994) and DeFond & Subramanyam (1998). This study uses the following model to 
estimate the discretionary accrual.  
,
,
∝
,
∆
, ,
    (1) 
where: 
TAi,t  = accrual total of firm i in year t;   
Ai,t-1      = total assets of firm i in year t-1; 
                                                                
10 KMK (MOF decree) No. 359/2003 permits audited company to be audited by the same auditor even though the 
five years limitation has been reached if the company and its auditor have already signed an agreement to audit in 
2003. 
11 After 2008, mandatory rotation is after six years. 
12 Interested readers can consult with Krishnan (2003) to follow the logic behind the use discretionary accruals as a 
proxy for audit quality. 
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∆REVt     = net change in income of firm i in year t; 
PPEi,t     = gross value of PPE of firm i in year t; and 
ɛi      = error term.     
The discretionary accrual is the errors aforementioned above (DeFond & Subramanyam, 
1998; Francis & Yu, 2009). This study uses an absolute unstandardized residual as a proxy for 
discretionary accrual. Later, that discretionary accrual value is incorporated into the following 
equation below: 
, , , , ,  (2) 
 
Where: 
AbsURi  =  cross-sectional absolute value of the unstandardized residual of firm i; 
DROTi,t  =  dummy variable: 1 for the auditor mandatory rotation, 0 others; 
Pseudoi,t   =     dummy variable: 1 if the auditor rotation is pseudo-mandatory, 0 if others; 
DBBi,t    =  dummy variable: 1 if the auditor rotation occur among Big 4, 0 if others; 
DBKi,t     =  dummy variable: 1 if the auditor rotation occur from Big 4 to the smaller 
accounting firms, 0 if others; 
DKBi,t     =   dummy variable: 1 the auditor rotation occur from  the smaller accounting firms to 
Big 4, 0 if others; 
θi     =     error terms. 
Equation (2) is used for testing the first to the third hypothesis. The first hypothesis is 
accepted if coefficient b1 is statistically different from zero. Likewise, the second hypothesis is 
accepted if coefficient b2 is statistically different from zero. Meanwhile, coefficients b3 to b5, 
which are testing the hypothesis four, are used to assess the differences between accounting 
firms of different sizes.  
 
Hypothesis 4 
The fourth hypothesis tests the differences between firms that implement pseudo-mandatory 
rotation and firms that implement the pure mandatory rotation. The regulation of mandatory 
rotation is made in order to ensure the high level of independency exercised. If an accounting 
firm is willing to utilize the regulatory loopholes by retaining a certain client, we can expect that 
the retained client has different characteristics compared to those who are not being retained. 
Therefore, the testing of the fourth hypothesis is the testing in the difference of the two group 
companies’ characteristics. 
 The point of observation is when an accounting firm changes its name (including the 
personnel of public accountants/CPAs) and continuously retains the client after the sixth year. 
This is possible since changing name does not violate the Article 3 verse 4 and 5 of decree 
No.17/2008. According to the Article, the client “X” has already been considered changing its 
auditor in seventh year to the auditor “B”, alias “A”.  
  One of the most relevant company’s characteristics that encourage accounting firms to 
change their name is the amount of auditing fee received from the clients. However, the data on 
auditing fee is not available in Indonesia. An auditing fee can be represented by the company's 
asset value or market capitalization or other financial characteristics. The hypothesis is being 
tested by comparing the two groups’ characteristics on the year of the rotation.  
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Results 
We divide our analysis into two sections. Section one is for the first two hypotheses tests’ results 
and section two is for the fourth hypothesis. Furthermore, as readers can find in the descriptive 
statistics subsection, both sections have different final samples due to the different requirements 
in sampling procedures. 
First, second, and third hypotheses  
Samples are non-financial companies listed from 2003 to 2015. We check auditor of each 
samples as far as 1998 to 2003. Sampling criteria are also based on the regression models (1) and 
(2). The resulting samples are as in Table 1 below. 
 
 
Table 1: Samples 
Description Number 
Nonfinancial samples-companies listed 1998-2015 3978 
Nonfinancial samples-companies listed 1998-2001 (884) 
Samples that do not perform audit rotation in 2002 – 2015 (1747) 
Incomplete data in 2002-2015 (490) 
Total samples-companies 857 
 
 Descriptive statistics are presented below. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (N=857) 
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean 
Modus 
(freq) 
Std. Deviation 
ABSUR 0.00019 5.09270 0.12777 n.a 0.28930 
DROT 0 1 0.17 0 (714) 0.372 
PSEUDO 0 1 0.06 0 (804) 0.241 
DBB 0 1 0.34 0 (506) 0.474 
DBK 0 1 0.07 0 (795) 0.259 
DKB 0 1 0.09 0 (782) 0.281 
 
 
Table 2 shows the minimum and maximum value of ABSUR which are 0.00019 and 
5.09270. Higher residual indicates higher earnings management or lower audit quality. Of 857 
auditor rotation (DROT), 714 rotations are voluntary and 143 are mandatory. Among 53 out of 
857 rotations are pseudo (PSEUDO), 351 rotations are between Big 4 accounting firms (DBB), 
62 rotations are from Big 4 to smaller accounting firms, and 75 rotations are from smaller 
accounting firms to Big 4 ones. There are 430 rotations from a non-Big 4 to another non-Big 4 
accounting firms during our study.  
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Table 3: Regression results 
Variables Beta t & F value Significance 
Constant 0.175 12.191 0.000*** 
DROT -0.075 -1.909 0.057*** 
PSEUDO 0.007 0.127 0.899*** 
DBB -0.086 -3.942 0.000*** 
DBK -0.066 -1.694 0.091*** 
DKB -0.019 -0.433 0.665*** 
F  4.443 0.001*** 
Adjusted-R2 0.019 
*, **, *** significance when alpha is 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
 The results in Table 3 indicate that the model has F-value 4.443 and statistically 
significant with adjusted-R2 is 1.9%. The DROT is negative, marginally and statistically 
significant. The negative and significant coefficient indicates that the discretionary accruals of 
firms that mandatorily rotate their auditors is lower than that of voluntarily ones. Since lower 
discretionary accruals means higher audit quality, we can conclude that firms that mandatorily 
rotate their auditors have higher audit quality. This result supported the first hypothesis.  
When the test is between pseudo mandatory rotation and others (PSEUDO), the result 
indicates that no statistically significant difference between the earlier and the later. Insignificant 
result tells us that neither pseudo mandatory rotation nor other types of rotation resulting in 
higher audit quality. This is quite interesting since DROT variable indicates that mandatory 
rotation is related to higher audit quality and we suspect that pseudo type of rotation will have a 
lower audit quality. This result cannot corroborate our second hypothesis.  
Moreover, our test provides some interesting evidences. First, discretionary accruals of 
firms that switch between two Big 4 accounting firms (DBB) are statistically and significantly 
lower than that of other switching firms. It indicates that audit quality of auditees that switch 
from one of a Big 4 accounting firm to the other are higher than that of auditees that switch 
between accounting firms of other types.  
The same conclusion can also be drawn when we compare the discretionary accruals of 
auditees that switch from a Big 4 accounting firm to a lower one (DBK) to other types of 
switching. The coefficient is negative and statistically significant. It means that companies that 
move from a bigger accounting firm to a smaller one have higher audit quality than that of other 
companies that use other types of switching, but still not better than bigger to bigger switching.   
In general, if we look at the coefficients, we can conclude that DBB type of switching has 
the lowest discretionary accruals than DBK type. Above all, the DKK type of switching has the 
largest value of discretionary accruals. Since we do not have a statistically significant coefficient 
of DKB, we can only conclude that DBB type of switching has the highest audit quality, 
following by DBK and DKK type of switching. These findings support out third hypothesis.  
Fourth hypotheses  
 The interesting question related to the auditor rotation is why some accounting firms 
“voluntarily and willingly” dissolve their firms and reform a new one, while still maintaining 
their affiliation. The motive is obvious, i.e. to take advantage of the loopholes in the regulation 
so that important clients are retained. This test is aimed to uncover the motives behind the 
behavior of some accounting firms.   
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Table 4: Distribution of rotating accounting firms 
Year Pure mandatory 
rotation 
Total Pseudo mandatory 
rotation 
Total Voluntary Total Grand 
total 
Big 4 NonBig 4 Big 4 NonBig 4 Big 4 NonBig 4 
2003 2 5 7 9 0 9 25 37 62 78 
2004 1 2 3 4 4 8 17 56 73 84 
2005 0 1 1 0 0 0 29 32 61 62 
2006 0 0 0 0 1 1 44 41 85 86 
2007 1 0 1 0 0 0 26 31 57 58 
2008 0 1 1 0 0 0 8 29 37 38 
2009 1 9 10 5 10 15 2 37 39 64 
2010 0 2 22 9 5 14 46 29 75 91 
2011 0 3 3 0 1 1 5 41 46 50 
2012 1 1 2 0 0 0 20 29 49 51 
2013 0 2 2 1 0 1 7 19 26 29 
2014 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 39 44 45 
2015 0 5 5 2 16 18 53 21 74 97 
Total 
(%) 
6 
(16%) 
31  
(84%) 
37 
(5%) 
30 
(44%) 
38  
(56%) 
68 
(8%) 
287 
(39%) 
441  
(61%) 
728 
(87%) 
833 
(100%) 
 
 Table 4 tells us that number of rotations occurred in 2017 are 97 rotations. Voluntary 
rotations are on the highest type, i.e. 728 out of 833 rotations, followed by pseudo mandatory 
rotations (68 rotations), and pure mandatory are the lowest (37 rotations). The table also 
indicates that non-Big 4 accounting firms have a larger portion of rotating clients, i.e. 405 
clients, while Big 4 accounting firms only audited 323 of them. Our samples of pure mandatory 
rotations are dominated by non-Big 4’s clients, while pseudo mandatory rotations are slightly 
dominated by non-Big 4’s clients. On the other side, voluntary rotations are also dominated by 
non-Big 4’s clients.  
 
Table 5: Financial characteristics of rotating companies (in billion rupiahs) 
Characteristics Min Max Mean Std. Deviation 
Assets Pure-mandatory 107 66,824 3,694 11,426 
Pseudo-mandatory 63 111,774 7,857 18,899 
Voluntary 0.567 242,392 4,448 14,789 
Sales Pure-mandatory 13 22,324 1,730 4,074 
Pseudo-mandatory 13 129,991 7,331 18,872 
Voluntary (5) 184,196 3,065 10,050 
Net income Pure-mandatory (64) 1,985 113 353 
Pseudo-mandatory (2,110) 14,366 850 2,646 
Voluntary (4,603) 15,489 218 1,204 
Common stock 
market value 
Pure-mandatory 13 24,080 1,344 4,042 
Pseudo-mandatory (3,766) 49,310 3,645 8,761 
Voluntary (11,250) 102,043 1,749 6,276 
 
 Table 5 provides some financial characteristics of samples. Those characteristics may be 
related to the motive of an accounting firm to engage in one of two types of mandatory 
rotations.13 The mean value of all characteristics of pseudo rotation groups are the largest among 
the other two groups. If we compare between pure mandatory versus voluntary rotations, we can 
conclude that pure mandatory rotation group is the lowest among the three group. This fact is 
interesting since, as Table 4 shows, more auditees belong to pseudo mandatory group than pure 
mandatory one. Even though the largest portion of our samples belong to voluntary group, the 
                                                                
13 We cannot certain which client that has become the motive for an accounting firm to take the dissolve-and-reform 
action. One indication may be when a certain client has reached its six-year limit before the accounting firm dissolve 
and reform itself. This problem of identification may become our weaknesses. 
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pseudo mandatory rotation group in average has the highest value from each of financial 
characteristics observed.  
 We then test groups in pair and the summary of the results are presented in Table 6 
below:  
 
Table 6: Independent sample t-test results 
Characteristics p-value 
Assets Mandatory vs. voluntary  0.217*** 
Pure vs. pseudo 0.224*** 
Pseudo vs. voluntary 0.152*** 
Pure vs. voluntary 0.760*** 
Sales Mandatory vs. voluntary  0.146*** 
Pure vs. pseudo 0.021*** 
Pseudo vs. voluntary 0.070*** 
Pure vs. voluntary 0.422*** 
Net income Mandatory vs. voluntary  0.087*** 
Pure vs. pseudo 0.027*** 
Pseudo vs. voluntary 0.055*** 
Pure vs. voluntary 0.598*** 
Common stock 
market value 
Mandatory vs. voluntary  0.160*** 
Pure vs. pseudo 0.069*** 
Pseudo vs. voluntary 0.085*** 
Pure vs. voluntary 0.698*** 
*, **, *** significance when alpha is 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 The results of independent sample t-test presented in Table 6 show that we cannot find 
statistical differences between mandatory and voluntary group based on all financial 
characteristics tested, except for net income. When using net income, it indicates that there is a 
marginal statistical difference between mandatory versus voluntary groups. We also cannot 
provide evidence that, in terms of assets, those groups are of different size. Therefore, we can 
conclude that assets may not be a factor for choosing type of rotation, especially between pure 
and pseudo mandatory rotations.  
 The interesting findings are statistically and significantly different between pure versus 
pseudo mandatory rotation. Sales, net income, and common stock market value between 
companies of those groups may become factors for accounting firms to choose whether to 
dissolve and reform their accounting firms or not. The results imply that auditees with high sales 
or net income or common stock market value may trigger an incumbent accounting firm to 
dissolve the firm and, then, form a new one, so such firm can keep one or more auditees as their 
clients for another six years. Logically, auditees with huge net income can pay more auditing 
fees than one with lower net income. Client with a deep pocket is worthy to be kept, even the 
accounting firm has to dissolve their firm before re-forming a new one. One indication of such 
action is by looking at the foreign affiliation of accounting firm.14  
Conclusion and future research 
This research is based on the idea of whether mandatory auditor rotation will result in higher 
audit quality. The Indonesian government enacted the regulation to mandate auditor rotation in 
                                                                
14 As example, INCO was audited by Hadi Sutanto and partners from 1999-2003 (five years). According the 
regulation, INCO must change its auditor from 2004. In fact, the auditor change to Haryanto Sahari and partners. 
However, both accounting firms were affiliated with PWC.  
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2002 which since then mandatory rotation seems to be an accepted practice in Indonesia. 
However, the reality is that accounting firms found their own way to deceive the regulation of 
mandatory rotation. In a newspaper published in 2015, a senior auditor in Indonesia15 stated that 
changing accounting firm’s name, and changing partners, including to set some partners to be 
inactive partners of the firm or recruiting new partners are strategies used to take advantage of 
the loopholes in the regulation. The motive is unstated, but public can guess as it is related to 
accounting firm’s sustainable income. By applying that strategy, an accounting firm can keep 
one or more important, deep pocket clients with them as long as they wish. Instead of changing 
its auditor after the sixth year, the company is still the auditee of the old accounting firm since 
the (local) auditor has “changed”—even though the foreign affiliation is still the same— and no 
regulation has been violated. This is what we call as pseudo mandatory auditor rotation. 
 Our study finds that auditees in this pseudo mandatory rotation group have higher sales, 
net income, and market value of common stocks than that of auditees in pure mandatory rotation 
group. This finding confirms our hypothesis. Financial motives seem to be behind the choice of 
the auditor to dissolve and reform the firm itself though competition among accounting firms and 
small number of deep pocket clients have urged accounting firms to find a way to maintain their 
income. If the idea behind the mandatory rotation is to preserve auditor independency after a 
long auditor-client relationship, then the question of the effectiveness of such regulation is 
important. 
 Our test of the first hypothesis confirms that companies which belong to mandatory 
rotation group have higher audit quality than that of other groups. We, then, test the audit quality 
of companies that belong to pseudo mandatory rotation and we cannot find a corroborative 
evidence which pseudo mandatory rotation companies have higher audit quality than others. 
When we test on the differences of audit quality of companies that switching accounting firms 
from same or different sizes, the results indicate that audit qualities of auditees the switch 
between Big 4 accounting firms are higher than that of auditees that switch between accounting 
firms of different size. The higher discretionary accruals or the lowest audit quality is found 
among samples that move between smaller accounting firms. These latter findings give empirical 
support to previous studies back to the work of DeAngelo (1981) earlier that higher audit quality 
is related to bigger accounting firm. 
 The main limitation of our studies is related to the measurement of the audit quality. A 
qualified audit, by definition, is an audit performed by a competent and independent auditor 
(DeAngelo, 1981). We choose discretionary accruals as the measurement of audit quality while, 
in fact, known as measurement of earnings management. We base our logic on the idea that a 
good auditor will find an abnormal accruals (i.e. equals to competence) and will not allow those 
abnormal accruals to be included in the audited financial statement (i.e. equals to independence). 
Further studies may consider other alternatives to measure audit quality.  
 The second limitation is related to the timing of measuring audit quality. In this study, we 
only observe audit quality at the time of the switching. This is contrary to common belief that the 
first years of audit is associated with higher audit risk. Future research may consider to use 
longer time period to measure audit quality of single sample.  
 Future studies should explore the reason behind strategies used by accounting firm even 
more. We limit our attention only on the financial aspects, while non-financial factors may play 
some parts. For example, key persons in both corporations may influence the decision. We also 
                                                                
15 Business Indonesia, May 12, 2015. The article was retrieved from 
http://starbrainindonesia.com/berita/media/40971/3/rotasi-audit-dihapus-kap-bakal-menggelia on May 29, 2017. 
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do not explore which client(s), among some, that drive such behavior. The last important aspect 
future research must consider is the fact that all local accounting firms that are affiliated with Big 
4 accounting have chosen the dissolve and reform strategy, so the classification of pseudo or 
pure rotation may need to be reconsidered in the future. 
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